The axing of the troubled Nimrod MRA4 project in 2010 SDSR has left Britain unable to properly patrol its waters and left a serious gap in anti-submarine capability. In 2015 the government tacitly admitted its mistake and announced the plan to purchase nine Poseidon P-8A Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) from Boeing in the United States. In the first part of this article we will look at the programme and infrastructure behind its introduction into service, and the aircraft itself.
Background
Although the US Navy operates its own aircraft, by a historical anomaly the RAF have always owned the UK MPAs – a critical naval capability. This arrangement will continue as only the RAF has the facilities and experienced personnel needed to support the next generation. Since the 1950s, the RAF operated the Shackleton and then the Nimrod MR1 and MR2 maritime patrol aircraft which were largely successful in this role. The planned successor to the Nimrod MR2 was another Nimrod, the MRA4. The tale of woe that led to the eventual cancellation of the MRA4 is long, complicated and depressing and has been discussed in much detail elsewhere. In broad terms the decision to build a ‘new’ aircraft utilising existing ancient Nimrod airframes was disastrous. This and many other factors, meant that by 2010 the project was £789 million over-budget and over nine years late. It should be noted that a production aircraft was flying in 2009 and the first aircraft had been delivered to the RAF. Although there were still serious flaws, it was not perhaps as unsafe or hopeless as government claimed at the time. Anyway, the MRA4 was cancelled and the airframes were chopped into pieces with extraordinary haste, effectively throwing away the £4Bn already spent on the project.
Even by normal dismal defence procurement standards, this government, MoD, BAE Systems and RAF collective failure was a scandal of spectacular proportions.
Enter Posiedon
The P-8A Poseidon has been in development since 2004 intended to replace the venerable turboprop Orion P-3. The P-8 airframe has little in common with the Nimrod or the P-3, being based on a modern, and extremely successful commercial airliner, the Boeing 737-800. On 25 March 2016 the US government approved the sale of nine P-8s to the UK. Although the Japanese P-1 was given cursory consideration, the P-8 was always the strong favourite and is being procured as a direct government sale. Controversially no competition was held and the purchase is not subject to the MoD’s single source regulatory framework. Given the urgency of the situation, this was perhaps sensible. Although expensive, the P-8 is the simply best available option and ease of interoperability with the US Navy is always desirable. The US Navy is buying at least 117 aircraft, Australia 12, India 9 and Norway 5, so the UK will benefit from a multinational development programme and economies of scale.
Having shot itself in the balls with the MRA4 debacle, the UK aerospace industry is in no position to complain about this major foreign purchase. Fortunately, as part of the P-8 deal, Boeing has agreed to expand its UK workforce from 1,300 to 4,000 and is opening a major new aircraft repair and maintenance hub at Boscombe Down. UK industry will also have opportunities to be involved in training and support work for the P-8.
On 11 July 2016, the UK signed a $3.87 billion contract with Boeing for the 9 aircraft and elements of their support which will be delivered in 3 batches. The schedule calls for the first two aircraft to be delivered in 2019, with three more in 2020 and the final four in 2021. It will be at least 12 years after the end of the Nimrod MR2 (which at one time numbered 35 aircraft) before the re-establishment of a ‘full strength’ squadron of 9 P-8s
Regenerating on the front foot
There were those, including some in the RAF, who were not especially enthusiastic about the P-8 and hoped that the focus could be steered away from maritime and instead obtain a more generic ISTAR Multi-Mission Aircraft and/or long range UAVs. However the RAF did have the foresight not to make all its Nimrod aircrew redundant in 2010. The Seedcorn exchange programme has seen around 30 RAF personnel serving aboard US, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand aircraft on 3-4 year tours. UK personnel have already accumulated more than 1,000 hours of flying time on US Navy P-8s and even have won various awards in international anti-submarine warfare competitions. This demonstrates the wealth of skill that the Nimrod force had acquired and will be able to contribute to bringing the P-8 into service. The RAF has also persuaded personnel who previously served on Nimrod to assist with the P-8 introduction. 12 have recently re-joined the RAF and more are set to re-join in the future.
The P-8 will be based at RAF Lossiemouth in North East Scotland. (The Nimrod’s former Scottish base was at RAF Kinloss which has since been converted to an Army base). Despite the ongoing complaints by nationalists about lack of defence investment in Scotland and worries over the future of the Union, the UK government is set to invest further in new support infrastructure including new runways and hangars. Boeing will also set up a P-8 maintenance hub at Lossiemouth and is investing £100M and will create around 100 new jobs. An extra 600 personnel are expected to be stationed at the base by 2020.
Aircraft overview
Although based on the 737-800ERX, the P-8A is a very different aircraft. The wings are based on the 737-900 but have been substantially re-designed to cope with the stress of more low altitude flying than a commercial jet and to provide four hard-points for weapons. The fuselage has been substantially redesigned with a bomb bay and additional fuel tanks replacing luggage holds. The airframe life will be around 25 years or 25,000 flying hours in tough high and low conditions over the sea and is able to operate in icing conditions or extreme temperatures.
A variety of additional sensors and antenna are mounted externally, all linked to the sophisticated mission systems. It is these sensors and electronics that are the real cost-drivers for an aircraft with a price tag of around £350 Million (Before support and weapons costs are added). The computing and data fusion abilities of the aircraft are what set it apart from other MPAs. The P-8 has the world’s most powerful onboard sonobuoy data processing capability and has space for more sonobuoys than any other MPA. The P-8 was also designed from the outset to be able to control and monitor data from the MQ-4C Triton Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) unmanned aerial vehicle. Although a highly desirable force multiplier and rumours about UK Triton orders prior to SDSR 2015, the MoD has no plan or funding in place for such a purchase.
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Flight deck of the P-8. -
MPA basics – Port and starboard observer windows allow the sea to be scanned with the “Mark 1 eyeball” (US Navy Photo) -
Under the hood – AN/APY-10 synthetic aperture radar designed for both coastal and overland surveillance (Image: KeyAero) -
The retractable MX-20HD electro-optical camera and infrared sensor turret (Image: US Navy) -
Open bomb bay showing the 5 hard points for torpedos. Also visible forward are the 6 sonobuoy dispenser openings flanked by the Common data link (CDL) attennas. (Photo: Rami Khanna-Prade, via Flickr) -
Under the APU exhaust is the AN/AAQ-24(V) Directional Infrared Countermeasure (DIRCM) system for protection from heat seeking missiles. (Photo via b747.org) -
Removing a Sonobuoy from storage rack ready to be placed in dispenser (US Navy Photo) -
RAF aircrew at one of the P-8’s five mission workstations – serving with US Navy operating the P-8 under the ‘Seedcorn’ initiative to keep UK MPA skills alive (US Navy photo)
The aircraft is powered by two CFM56-7 turbofans, one of the most widely used jet engines in the world, with over 30,000 manufactured as of 2016. Most MPAs have four engines which provide a measure of redundancy when operating for long distances away from land. However the CFM56 is exceptionally reliable with shutdown rates around three per million flight hours. In the three years the P-8A has been in service it has yet to have an in-flight engine shutdown. Electrical power is provided by a 180KVA generator on each engine and a standard 90KVA back-up APU. With a total of 450KVA available, there is more than enough to support the mission systems with plenty of capacity for additional equipment to be fitted in future.
The P-8 has an endurance of around 10.5 hours at an economical cruising speed of around 500 knots at high altitude, with an approximate unrefuelled range of 4,500 miles. Operating at low level, the aircraft can fly in a fuel efficient regime at 180Knots, just 60m above the sea. Crews are trained to refuel their own aircraft so the P-8 can land at civilian airports and utilise standard commercial jet fuelling facilities if required. Unfortunately, when first delivered, only US tanker aircraft will be able to conduct in-flight refuelling with the UK P-8. The RAF Voyager tanker is fitted with a probe and drogue system rather than the flying boom used by the USAF. It is possible the aircraft could be modified in future to address this problem.
In US Navy service the Poseidon is operated by nine aircrew which includes the flight commander, two pilots, two tactical coordinators, two anti-submarine weapon systems operators and two electronic warfare weapon system operators. There is no dedicated flight engineer.
Although the process is far too slow, the UK has retained just enough skills and is putting the right infrastructure in place to gradually re-enter the MPA game. By selecting the P-8, the RAF will have the best platform available to conduct maritime patrol, anti-submarine warfare and search and rescue. We will consider the more complex questions about how the aircraft may be operated and weapons integration in part 2 of this article.
Allowing for acknowledging failings in the UK’s defence industrial base identified in this well-researched article, it as well to examine the reasons behind the Government’s decision to buy the Poseidon P-8A to plug the gap in its maritime patrol capability.
Whereas the Ministry of Defence will not come out and say so publicly, it is clear that MoD’s preference for looking at the off-the-shelf solution as its first option, when deciding on which military equipment to buy, has been the determining factor in its choice of the Poseidon P-8A.
After being misled by UK-based defence equipment manufacturers with false promises and lies for several decades, this generation of elite politicians, senior civil servants, military top brass and front-line procurement officials have been so badly scarred that, there remains little appetite to consider any alternatives that may be put forward by these same dishonest suppliers.
Of course, MoD would favour an off-the-shelf equipment because it corresponds to a fully engineered and supported technical solution which satisfies the totality of the technical specification requirement, at no additional cost or risk to MoD, that is to say, it does not require any UK-specific modifications or related development work laden with risk to be performed upon it.
Accordingly, it is entirely understandable that MoD has opted to spend nearly £4bn on this US-designed and manufactured product. It has done so for the following reasons:
(a) MoD will have had the benefit of evaluating the hardware configuration of the technical solution to assure itself that the standard Poseidon P-8A satisfies the technical specification requirement set by the military customer, in particular the key user requirements, before placing an order.
(b) Acknowledging the fact that the cost of acquiring and re-provisioning Support Assets associated with military equipment over the whole life cycle can be in the order of four to five times the prime equipment costs, MoD will have sought and obtained firm selling prices, not only for the Poseidon P-8A weapons platform itself, but also its Support Assets needed to sustain the fleet for the full period of its service life – enabling it to maintain a fixed, through-life budget without any risk of it being breached.
(c) MoD will have been able to verify that there exists a fully functioning production line for the Poseidon P-8A, before taking the main investment decision.
(d) Commonality and interoperability with US armed forces, on any likely future operations brings with it the certainty that replacement spare parts for this platform will be made available, via a common logistics supply chain – thereby reducing in-service support costs considerably.
If anyone has any doubt about the determination of this Government to look at the off-the-shelf solution as its first option, then they should consider this irrefutable fact – that settling on the choice of the Poseidon P-8A means that these aircraft cannot be refuelled in-flight, by RAF tanker planes to extend their range and endurance on-station, because the former is fitted with the flying-boom receptacle whereas the latter is equipped with the probe-and-drogue system, making them entirely incompatible. The MoD has taken a lot of flak from informed commentators and endured negative publicity in the press and media for this serious operational shortcoming – nevertheless, it has decided to go ahead with the purchase.
The decision to go for the off-the-shelf solution is entirely justified because the P-8A Poseidon is a mature and stable design standard devoid of any hidden financial, technical or schedule risks which have dogged the so-called, minimal development solutions proposed by UK-based defence equipment manufacturers.
Another beneficial side-effect to be derived from MoD shifting its attention onto the off-the-shelf buy is that those UK-based defence equipment manufacturers who are left high and dry by this subtle policy adjustment, most notably the Select Few, will have no choice but to increase their competitiveness substantially, by first selling their products in the international marketplace – on price, superior technical performance, timely delivery & without bribing public officials via intermediaries – and then re-entering the domestic market with renewed confidence and fully developed products rebranded as off-the-shelf offerings, just as the Americans have done!
@Jag Patel on twitter
What happened to all the kit from the mr4?Just how hard can it be to fit a probe? I quite fancy the idea of a few multipurpose cheaper force multipliers for SAR, surveillance, etc.
I wouldn’t be surprised if any stripped out systems are all but gone now, sold on to anybody who uses the same subsystems in other platforms.
As for fitting a probe to the P8a frankly it makes more sense to get AirTanker to fit a boom to a couple of Voyager Tankers. It is a certified conversion already and the Australians have paid for the contact and refuelling trials with the A330 Tanker.
It might seem like a good idea at face value to fit any surplus subsystems to a smaller cheaper platform but the MOD and military hate that kind of thing. That means inducting another type with all the associated logistic costs. More importantly the UK armed forces doesn’t have enough of the bipedal meat bags needed to support and crew them! That is one of the reaasons why the Batch 1 River class and HMS Clyde will be replaced with the new Batch 2 River, they can’t crew 9 OPV in three distinct sub classes. For that matter don’t really want five but ToBA caught them out. Five new OPV in one single class is more manageable.
There will be no problem finding a buyer for the Batch 1 River and Clyde, a number of navies would eagerly snap them up. Thailand already operates a River 1 variant for example and might want more quick or Bangladesh who snapped up the Castle class when they were paid off.
9 is really the bare minimum required for the role when you consider how many Nimrod MRA4’s were being sought in the 90s and early 00’s. The threat and spread of operations has at the very least remained the same, and arguably increased over the last few years. 12 should be the figure to aim for, with any more being a welcome bonus, and certainly extra air-frames if Poseidon is eventually modified to take on the Sentinel’s ISTAR role as well.
Also the article mentions 3 batches of aircraft between 2019-2021 which i sadly fear is a typo as i thought i’d read it will take until the late 2020’s for all 9 to arrive….a truly glacial rate of delivery if true.
The delivery dates are those published by MoD/Boeing, although it maybe some years after the final aircraft arrives before the whole force is fully operational.
It will be interesting to see how a standard airline aircraft wing designed for high altitude cruising will perform in sustained low altitude flight in “bumpy” conditions.
Its worth pointing out that the Nimrod replacement was originally expected to be a joint UK/US project as a Nimrod/Orion replacement, but when we were due to start the USN deferred their back 15 yrs as they had plenty of spare Orion’s in storage due to the end of the Cold War, whilst we had wasted our best Nimrod airframes on the AEW3 farce. Thus we went with the poorly conceived low cost Nimrod MRA4 option from BAE which proved to be a disaster.
BTW Boeing were systems integrators on Nimrod MRA4 and used this to develop their P-9 proposal and some of the Nimrod MRA4A team have been fundamental in getting the P-8 developed and into service.
The 9 P-8’s are the minimum required to regenerate MPA capabilities, we may well see a 2nd batch in the next SDSR to increase capacity and proved those secondary Battlespace roles envisioned by the RAF for MRA4 and those currently performed by the Sentinel. (There is a story that the nail in the coffin of the MRA4 was that the RAF had assigned them for stand-off Strike with Storm Shadow, Battlespace management and training that of the 9 airframes none would have been available for the original intended MPA role and when they asked for more airframes at an eye watering price the programme was cancelled ! ).
Looking forward to the P-8 entering service, its what we should have had originally if the schedules hadn’t got mucked up and should do sterling work in the role it was intended for.
We are surrounded by Sea. Know that it’s a No-No but surely as we are only having 9 and these a slated for MPA role would it not be best these were a FAA asset? If we had 12-15 some could get dragged off to other roles and RAf could play with them. Its not only badges, its being sea minded a faculty we seem to have lost in some measure.
This is an interesting piece. But this argument is moot because the decision to use the P8 was always fraught with problems yet the MOD has gone ahead with it. It solved the only major problem that the MOD has, which is it’s own inability to manage anything other than an off the shelf purchase.
The problems with the P8 option are well known they are
1. Complete reliance on US Tankers to provide any meaningful range. In extremis we hope the USAF are given the political approval if the UK is involved in Falklands MkII where are interests do not overlap with that of the USA. There is no way you can safely build a probe around the heavily congested electronic lines that run from the Cabin (similar problems with Fuel Line runs that brought down the Nimrod over Afghanistan) and we have no money or plans to convert any MRRT’s to boom configuration. Thus our major anti Submarine and Shipping airborne platform has range limitations.
2. It is designed to use disposable drone kits for low level observation, for MAD deployment and the MQ4. All of which the UK hasn’t got and isn’t buying. So you are not taking your £300m aircraft developed as a high flying and cruising airliner down in a storm to identify anything. We don’t have the kit to replace that capability.
3. Launching offensive weapons. Since the UK has not ordered any Mk48 torpedoes or their glider kit delivery systems, since we are not integrating brimstone or any other missile and since we aren’t buying air launched Harpoons exactly what RAF P8’s are going to launch is beyond me. And this is the problem the P8 is designed for high level engagement of surface and sub surface targets. The whole operating model is the with the P8 acting as high level director of a number of subsystems such as the MQ4 and Glider delivered torpedoes. We have bought half the farm.
Now some will argue that low level identification of targets is a thing of the past (although the first time a UK P8 drops a missile on top of Fast Fishing vessel in a storm in the Gulf because they thought it was going to attack a UK ship we will see) that MAD has limited relevance in modern ASW work, but the point is you are intentionally blinding yourself by not buying the whole package. If you commit to an off the shelf option such as the P8 you need to take the whole system of weapons, other sensor platforms and delivery methods. It is the equivalent of buying a Gun and not the bullets or all the sights. You can see the target, you might have the general direction, but you have nothing to sight you weapon with and nothing to shoot with. I wait with batted breath to see if HMG will actually place an order for the other parts of the weapons system or not.
If we only have got an incomplete weapons system in the P8. Would the Japanese P1 been a better option ?
It was in the running but Lost out to P8.
Why did P8 win out against P1?
For those bemoaning the lack of a probe (for the time being) on the RAF’s future MPA; similar discussion was had on the RC-135 Airseekers, the point was made that we’d rather have the airframes fully capable rather than the (usual) MoD cutting corners to fund the development and testing of probe equipment that no one had begun (The Indians with their P8’s also seem to have taken this route too). Either we had fewer airframes due to cost of developing it (and thus less capability and airframes to release RN and RAF assets tied up to fill the gap) or make do until inevitably we get caught out… dammed if you do, dammed if not.
Lest we forget the lives cost by the hash job that was the probes fitted to the Nimrod MR2’s, which some evidence seems to point it was similar on the MRA4’s.
MRA4s Fuel Systems were nothing at all alike to the MR2, The MRA4 Fuel System was a totally new system.
The Probe wasn’t actually commissioned (nor was it planned to be according to the updated contract).
We should be very careful about having too much faith in the MODs cancellation rationale, which was created to justify shit-canning the project whilst shifting the blame on BAE, much of this has been regurgitated by the press and much of it untrue (e.g. The Financial Times article in 2011 “It was unclear, for example, whether its bomb bay doors functioned properly, whether its landing gear worked and, most worryingly, whether its fuel pipe was safe.” None of which has a grain of truth! I have seen many hours of flight test footage – which clearly shows – all 3 systems working as designed.
Linking of the MRA4 fuel system to the tragic failures in the Fuel Systems of the MR2s was a real low blow by the MOD.
As for endurance – One of MRA4s long endurance test flights in 2007 gave an endurance of 13 hours – that was without IFR – so she the had long legs required for an MPA.
The Mission System integrated within the MRA4 (A BAE/Boeing joint produced system called TCS) was truly outstanding, once it was fully developed (by about 2005) – a derivative of this system is currently at the core of the P8.
MRA4 also had a MAD sensor (P8 cant use this as its operating altitude too high), it had a huge internal bomb bay that could carry up to 18 UK Torpedoes (Stingray), or Depth Charges, Smoke/SUSS, or ASR canisters, (it was initially designed to take Harpoon ASM, but could carry other ‘smart weapons’ due to its integrated MIL STD 1760 databus). it also had 4 under wing hard-points that could take smart weapons or Sidewinder AAM.
Despite the well documented issues of the air-frame/aerodynamics (was rectified in 2007/8 through the integration of SASS and SID) – MRA4 was an astounding aircraft and, once in service would have bettered the performance of the P8 (which is essentially a thin winged jetliner designed to operate at medium to high altitudes).
Whats more important is that MRA was a UK produced aircraft – not an import from the US.
The RAF already basically has the answer….stick all the kit from the Nimrods on a few Hercs, because guess what? Lockheed are bringing out the…….SC-130J maritime patrol version!
http://lockheedmartin.com/us/products/c130/c-130j-variants/sc-130j.html
This further enforces my point. The Lockheed option could have been a cheaper option with more airframes, it has a wing and control surfaces developed for low level extreme weather flying, and we had 12 of them that we have just chucked away. They were in need of a deep overhaul, but in Marshalls of Cambridge we had a UK centre of excellence, so instead of spending money in the US we could have spent it in the UK. Further the Lockheed proposal uses the same integration technology and sensors that are already on the Merlin. It can use UK weapons as well.
The problem was that
1. It meant the MOD would actually have to do it’s job and run a purchasing project, rather than buying off the shelf.
2. The RAF didn’t like it because it was not Gucci enough, by god it had propellers and not jet engines.
Hence without any form of competition or any published requirement document the MOD selected the P8. Is the P8 a bad solution, No, but it does come with limitations such as range extension which is critical in a Patrol aircraft, in sensors since the Americans use drones etal as above, and weapons integration. With the Boeing option the problem is we are a very small customer compared to the USA, to keep costs at a manageable limit that will mean we will only do upgrades and use weapons that the Americans have already paid to integrate.
The same problem existed with the P1 as it was designed using Japanese code and weapons, engine etc which would not have been easy to maintain or upgrade in the UK.
My own preference always was for the Sea Hercules with transferable equipment (as per the Merlin AEW kits developed by Lockheed in the UK very quickly) as stated we owned 12 ready to go aircraft, over time you could either upgrade the sensors or airframe separately, it had probe refuelling, we had ground crew and maintenance contracts in place for the Hercules (which we still have for the 12/10 models kept) in extremis the ASW kit could have been stripped out internally for extra Strategic Airlift capacity if needed urgently. Plus Lockheed where very keen to get a launch customer for the C130ASW so as to tap in to the huge renewal of P3’s in Europe over the next 20yrs. That would have given us a lead position to be the integration and servicing centre for that project across Europe.
Unfortunately due to it’s own failings and the fact BAe act like a business (Surprise, Surprise) the MOD ran scarred of a Golden Opportunity. Having just spent the weekend at RAF Cosford the RAF Museum, it would look like the MOD continues to perform how it always has since the Second World War in killing UK defence projects.
The fact is we will have 9 P8’s we have no money to buy more, forget the 18 that are needed, forget putting booms on the tankers even though the RAF now fly multiple platforms that need it, forget arming the P8’s, but it will pay for Boeing to open up a hanger in Scotland and look good on the CV.
It is clear scrapping nimrod was a big mistake costing billions to save as I understand it just 2 billions which as we had to buy a replacement we didn’t save anything The thing that baffles me is If I made such an expensive mistake I would be sacked! Why has no one fallen on their swords? The nimrod planes were brand new and nearly ready to go even if we couldn’t afford to finish them they could have been “Parked” and finished when we were better off !??
And once again were paying way over the odds for off the shelf yank kit. Isreal are getting it far cheaper.
Not only that nimrod could carry storm shadow and give a bomber ability back to GB. But nahhh.
Also a maritime a/c with 2 engines… splendid idea over middle of ocean.